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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1173 
___________ 
 
BRANDON L. FAKE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; KEVIN M. DOUGHERTY, Judge;  
MARGARET T. MURPHY, Judge; HOLLY J. FORD, Judge;  
JOEL S. JOHNSON, Judge; DIANNE J. FAKE; PATRICK J. MURPHY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 16-cv-03893) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 21, 2017 
Before:  SHWARTZ, COWEN and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Brandon L. Fake appeals from orders of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  We will affirm. 
 In July 2016, Fake filed a pro se complaint against 44 defendants, alleging a 
conspiracy in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in connection with divorce, 
support, and custody proceedings between Fake and his ex-wife that began in 2004.  The 
District Court granted Fake’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  The Court dismissed some claims with prejudice 
and others without prejudice and allowed Fake to file an amended complaint.  Dist. Ct. 
Mem., Dkt. #2 at 9-10.  
 In October 2016, the District Court dismissed Fake’s amended complaint, 
determining that his claims were either legally frivolous or that they failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.  Again, the District Court dismissed some of 
Fake’s claims with prejudice and some claims without prejudice.  Dist. Ct. Mem., Dkt. 
#6.  The Court allowed Fake another chance to file an amended complaint “only with 
respect to his claims that have not been dismissed with prejudice.”  Dist. Ct. Order, Dkt. 
#7. 
 Fake then filed a second amended complaint against the City, Dianne Fake (his ex-
wife), Patrick J. Murphy (who at the time was Under Secretary of the United States 
Army), and four judges1 who served on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas during 
                                              
1 The judges named as defendants are Judge Kevin M. Dougherty, Judge Margaret T. 
Murphy, Judge Joel S. Johnson, and Judge Holly J. Ford. 
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the time period in his complaint.  In December 2016, the District Court dismissed the 
second amended complaint with prejudice, determining that Fake failed to state a viable 
conspiracy claim, that he failed to state a basis for a claim against the City, and that the 
judicial defendants were entitled to judicial immunity.  Fake filed a timely appeal. 
 We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  
“[W]e accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  
We analyze the District Court’s determination that the complaint failed to state a claim 
under the standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).  Under that 
standard, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Although pro se pleadings must be held to “less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 
519, 520 (1972), “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to 
support a claim.”  Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 Fake raises five claims of error in his brief.  First, Fake challenges the District 
Court’s decision at screening to dismiss with prejudice the claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 18 U.S.C. § 242.  In that regard, Fake argues only that it 
was error to dismiss his claims with prejudice without discovery and a fair hearing.  But § 
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1915(e)’s screening provisions function in a manner similar to a party’s motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the screening 
should expose the deficiencies of the complaint “‘at the point of minimum expenditure of 
time and money by the parties and the court.’”  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (quoting 5 
Wright & Miller § 1216, at 233-234).  “Because [Fake’s] complaint is deficient under 
Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery.”  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686.  Nor was a hearing 
required.2 
 Fake’s second argument is that the District Court erred in dismissing claims 
against the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on the basis of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity because the state has “engaged in fraud.”  However, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania has not waived immunity from suit in federal court, and “Congress, in 
passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.”  
See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); see also 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 8521(b); Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 426 F.3d 233, 238-41 (3d Cir. 2005).  
And we further agree with the District Court that the Court of Common Pleas is not, in 
any event, a “person” subject to liability under § 1983.  See Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66. 
                                              
2 Fake does not give any other reasons for why he believes the District Court’s decision 
to dismiss these claims was wrong.  He has thus waived any other arguments concerning 
these claims.  See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 775 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004) (“An issue is 
waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief.”).  Nonetheless, we do not discern any 
error in the District Court’s decision to dismiss these claims. 
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 Fake’s third argument requires little discussion.  He argues that the “District Court 
refers to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as a Department of the City of 
Philadelphia” in its July 2016 memorandum.  Fake misreads that opinion by eliding the 
Court’s sentence regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity with the following sentence 
regarding departments of the City.  See Dist. Ct. Mem., Dkt. #2 at 10.  Fake appears to 
argue that his interpretation of the opinion caused him to drop the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas as a defendant in his second amended complaint.  But he was not 
prejudiced by his misreading, as the Court of Common Pleas is not subject to suit, as 
explained above. 
 Fake’s fourth argument is that the District Court improperly determined that the 
judicial defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, since they “have acted criminally 
under color of law and without jurisdiction, as well as actions taken administratively 
[sic].”  Judicial immunity extends to judicial officers, even if their actions were “in error, 
w[ere] done maliciously, or w[ere] in excess of [their] authority,” unless the officers 
acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction.  Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 
184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations, quotations omitted).  The complained-of acts 
were clearly performed by these defendants in their roles as judges, and the alleged 
procedural errors identified by Fake, such as those involved in scheduling or cancelling 
hearings, do not abrogate judicial immunity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359, 
362 (1978); see also Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 622 (7th Cir. 
2002) (scheduling of hearings is integral to judicial functioning and mere fact that 
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scheduling is a routine activity does not render the task “administrative or ministerial in 
nature”).  Nor would judicial immunity be lost even if some of the defendants, as Fake 
suggests, engaged in improper favoritism or ex parte communications.  See Nystedt v. 
Nigro, 700 F.3d 25, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2012).  Finally, Fake cannot sustain his request for 
injunctive relief; such claims are barred by the language of amendments to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 itself.  Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).3  
 Fake’s last argument is that the District Court improperly dismissed claims on the 
basis of the statute of limitations “for claims that occurred during the commission of 
fraud upon the Court.”  Fake states that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and its 
officers “have engaged in an unconscionable scheme to commit fraud upon the Court that 
has been continuing to the present date.”  But even if all of Fake’s claims against the 
Court of Common Pleas and the judicial defendants were timely, they fail on the basis of 
immunity, as described above. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 
                                              
3 Fake has waived any challenge to the dismissal of his claims of a judicial conspiracy 
between his ex-wife and other defendants as he does not raise such a challenge in his 
brief.  But in any event, we agree with the District Court that Flake’s complaint had not 
“assert[ed] facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.”  Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
Capogrosso, 588 F.3d at 184-85 (discussing pleading requirements in “judicial 
conspiracy” claims). 
